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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #01823-87/1
23 April 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Frederick L. Wetters
National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa (U)

A Warning and Forecast meeting on Sub-Saharan Africa was held on 21 April 1987. The attached report has not been coordinated with meeting participants but is being circulated to them. If they believe their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.


Frederick L. Wetters

Attachment:
NIC #01823-87

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NIC #01823-87
21 April 1987

WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

1. Intelligence community representatives discussed the following topics at the monthly warning meeting on 21 April.
2. DIA's DIO for Africa began the meeting by providing a brief summary of his recent trip to southern Africa. He noted that:

- [redacted] are pessimistic about the upcoming South African elections. They do not expect the elections to alter significantly the slow pace of reform.
- In Mozambique, the DIO observed very little military activity at the northern city of Quelimane, reported to be the main base of Mozambican and Tanzanian forces conducting offensive operations against the RENAMO insurgents. Military briefers in Quelimane, as well as the Mozambican Armed Forces Chief of Staff in Maputo, provided little of substance; they seemed to be withholding bad news.
- Botswana is deemphasizing its efforts to reassure South Africa that Gaborone is not aiding the ANC. Instead, it is putting new stress on improving military capabilities in order to punish South African raiders. The Botswanans are realistic about their limited prospects for success, however, and appreciate the risks involved.
- Zimbabwe suffers from foreign exchange shortages that constrain the economy. Unemployment is likely to rise, and the DIO sensed a general pessimism about economic prospects.

3. Brief Items:

(1) Zimbabwe/USSR - Arms Deal: Due to fast-breaking developments, this unscheduled item was added to the warning meeting agenda. CIA led the discussion which concluded that:

- CIA Soviet specialists now regard a Soviet-Zimbabwean arms deal as a real prospect, although they remain skeptical that MIG-29s will be delivered. They believe the Soviets will use a "bait and switch" tactic and ultimately substitute less advanced aircraft, such as the MIG-23. No aircraft deliveries are likely before 1989. The MIG-29 is too sophisticated for Zimbabwe's needs and capabilities, and financial arrangements remain incomplete. Moreover, the Soviets

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probably want to improve Zimbabwe's ground-based air defenses before delivering any MIGs because Soviet aircraft would be attractive targets for a South African attack. Nonetheless, Harare's recent recognition of the Soviet-backed regime in Afghanistan probably was the first installment on Zimbabwe's payment for Soviet arms.

- Analysts noted that Cuba lacks pilots qualified on the MIG-29, but Iraq and India have the plane and might temporarily provide pilots for Zimbabwe. Harare reportedly will send only black pilot trainees to the Soviet Union; Moscow regards white Zimbabweans as politically unreliable and probably will not train them on the MIG-29. The US and UK might offer aircraft to Zimbabwe to forestall a purchase from the Soviet Union, but neither is likely to do so.
- Noting that some Zimbabwean military officers oppose an arms deal with the Soviets, in part because of its high cost, the NIO speculated that Finance Minister Chidzero is likely to oppose the deal strongly and might resign. If so, the Zimbabwean Cabinet would lose its most effective voice for sensible economic and foreign policies.

(2) Uganda - State of the Insurgencies: CIA led the discussion and suggested that Uganda is sliding toward domestic instability and troubled relations with neighboring Kenya. There was consensus that:

- The Ugandan People's Democratic Movement (UPDM) insurgency in northern Uganda continues to grow steadily. Last summer, the UPDM had a few hundred former Okello regime soldiers; it now has 4,000 to 6,000. Government forces in the north then numbered about 7,000 personnel; today the NRA has about 17,000 troops there. Government forces stretched thin dealing with the UPDM must also cope with a few hundred Force Obote Back Again (FOBA) guerrillas in the east and Karamojong bandits in the northeast.
- Government control in the countryside is slipping. The NRA is losing popular support in the north due to its indiscriminate use of firepower and brutal interrogation techniques. Army morale is falling. And the Baganda in the south are increasingly dissatisfied that President Museveni has not yet implemented any corrections to the ailing economy.

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- Analysts are concerned about the UPDM's growth and some evidence that southern Sudanese officials are aiding them. The FOBA insurgency may further aggravate Uganda's strained relations with Kenya, and increasing human rights violations in Uganda may become a major irritant to relations with the US.

Warning Note: Uganda's insurgencies are becoming a long-term threat to the regime. Relations with Kenya probably will worsen. Instability in Kampala may grow over the months ahead.

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(3) Ethiopia/Somalia - Border Talks Deadlocked? CIA led the discussion and predicted that the border talks will continue but remain unproductive. There was agreement that:

- Somali negotiators are adamant that confidence-building measures are needed before dealing with demarcation of the border. The Ethiopians, however, insist on recognizing the existing frontier as the first order of business. Outside influence on the talks is not significant.
- Somalia is incapable of eliminating the Somali National Movement (SNM) insurgents. Mogadishu has tried to resuscitate the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) as an anti-Ethiopian insurgency to counter Addis Ababa's support for the SNM, but has had little success. Responding to a question, the speaker said that the Somali government has shown little interest in backing anti-Ethiopian irredentism recently but remains unwilling to renounce its territorial claims. Mogadishu sold out the Ogadenis' irredentist hopes long ago because the weak Somali army could not support them.
- Attacks by the SNM are likely to continue, particularly terrorist attacks on Somali officials and Ethiopian-aided cross-border operations. Occasional Ethiopian cross-border operations are likely, and Ethiopia will remain sensitive to any Somali cross-border operations against the SNM. Over the long term, Somalia probably will come under increasing border and insurgent pressures, and is likely to request additional military aid from the US as it becomes increasingly unable to counter cross-border incursions.

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(4) Chad - Retrospective: DIA began this critical review of why US analysts were surprised by President Habre's sudden and dramatic defeat of the Libyan forces. The discussion produced consensus that:

- Habre's opportunistic and risky attack at Ouadi Doum simply beat the odds. Sometimes a smaller and less well-equipped force can defeat a seemingly superior one--particularly if great risks are taken.

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- Libyan forces performed worse in the recent fighting than they had previously, thus we were misled by their track record. Libyan aircraft either didn't respond or they stayed so high to avoid SAMs that they were not effective. Libyan artillery was not effective either, largely because the Chadians moved into position surreptitiously and attacked at high speed. And the Libyans clearly deployed poorly and did not implement effective defensive patrolling.
- We underestimated the Chadians' will to win, and their long experience at desert warfare.

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(5) Chad - What's Next? DIA led the discussion and suggested that another stunning Chadian victory is unlikely over the near term. There was consensus that:

- Libya will not recover northern Chad over the near term, but its forces in Chad remain capable of stout defense. We would detect the major buildup and troop movements that would precede a major Libyan offensive. The 6,000 to 8,000 Libyan troops still in the Aozou and Tibesti areas have been ordered to dig in and defend. They include several mobile, lightly equipped, and better trained units that might perform better than did the troops at Ouadi Doum or Fada. There appears to be a conflict among senior Libyan leaders about the strategy to follow in Chad, however, and Qadhafi has not made his preference clear.
- Habre's forces probably will push the Libyans out of the Tibesti region, but he would prefer to bring former rebel leader Goukouni back into the fold before attacking again. The Tibesti mountains

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are Goukouni's homeland, and reconciliation with him might remove some resistance to Habre's army. The Libyans probably will offer some resistance to the attack, then withdraw to the Aouzou strip.

- Habre is not dependent upon France to supply his forces in the north. He can use captured northern airfields and his own C-130 aircraft to resupply them. Thus, France lacks great leverage to force Habre to negotiate a settlement with Qadhafi, and Habre is uninterested in negotiations for now. He also is unlikely to submit the Aozou strip question to the International Court of Justice as France and several African states would prefer.

Warning Note. Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks are likely, with Habre the ultimate target. Libyan subversive efforts in Sudan and Niger also are possible. Within the next 90 days, Habre's forces probably will try to mop up the Tibesti region, seize a mountain pass in the north, and attack Libyan forces at Aozou. They have good prospects for success, but the Chadians will have major logistic problems if the fighting becomes protracted. Habre might even try a surprise coup de main, attacking the major Libyan base at Aouzou airfield rather than picking off Libyan garrisons in the Tibesti mountains first. This would entail greater risks but, if successful, be a devastating blow to the Libyan military. US and French policies in Chad are now diverging; the US supports Habre's efforts to expel the remaining Libyans from Chad, but France would prefer that Habre restrain his forces and negotiate with Qadhafi. Paris is likely to proceed cautiously with Habre, however, to avoid a confrontation.

4. Main Items:

(1) South Africa/ANC - Prospects for Election Violence: CIA led the discussion and suggested that the potential for new South African or ANC attacks is increasing. There was consensus that:

- US analysts lack evidence to fix responsibility for the 9 April car bombing in Gaborone, Botswana. It may have been a South African attack on the ANC or a preemptive sabotage of an ANC operation, or it might have been an ANC or PAC operation that went awry. CIA slightly favored the thesis that it was an ANC operation that misfired because Botswana normally is quick to reveal evidence of South African attacks, and it has not done so in this case. An ANC attack, even if it backfired, would be provocative to Pretoria.
- Hours before the warning meeting, someone threw a grenade on a police parade ground in South Africa that wounded or killed an unknown number of policemen. The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) insurgent group subsequently claimed credit.
- With such provocations available to tout as justification, Pretoria could carry out a domestic crack-down or cross-border operation prior to the 6 May elections in order to sway conservative voters.

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In particular, a crackdown on organized labor is increasingly likely. The South African government will determine the harshness of its responses by how it perceives they will be received by the white electorate and the impact they will have on the 6 May elections.

- The ANC probably will carry out a few isolated bombings, but it lacks the capability to disrupt the elections. The group has promised not to disrupt the voting, and a major concerted effort to do so almost certainly is not planned.
- Meanwhile, some senior ANC officials have been purged, albeit for involvement in narcotics trafficking and other corruption rather than for reasons with East-West overtones. Joe Modise reportedly is in trouble, which could clear the way for Chris Hani to take over the military wing. Joe Slovo's resignation from the military wing could be a coverup of his dismissal, but analysts tend to believe his explanation that he stepped down voluntarily in order to spend more time on Communist Party matters. Slovo has several proteges in the military wing, and SACP influence there remains high.

Warning Note. A South African cross-border raid is increasingly likely. Some meeting participants felt that it is most likely before the elections, while others thought Pretoria probably will wait until after 6 May. South Africa has recently been most strident in criticizing Botswana and Zambia, but the rhetoric might be diversionary prior to attacking targets in Lesotho or Swaziland.

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(2) Sudan - Coping with Libyans, Insurgents, and Refugees: CIA began the discussion by suggesting that President Sadiq is in the midst of the worst political crisis of his rule. A lively exchange of views followed:

- The speaker suggested that key groups--including the General Staff, elements of the Umma Party leadership, and the ruling coalition partner Democratic Unionist leadership--are dissatisfied with Sadiq's performance. Sudanese military officers were angered by the Libyan military activity in western Sudan which they apparently believe Sadiq permitted without consulting them first. They may be plotting against Sadiq. Meanwhile, Umma Party leaders from Darfur Province are being criticized by their constituents for not expelling the Libyans. And Sadiq's effort to bring the National Islamic Front (NIF) into the government threatens to provoke a Umma Party revolt.

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- Turning to Libya's recent delivery of 4 MIG-23s to Sudan, the speaker suggested that Qadhafi sent the MIGs because he wanted to appease the Sudanese military in order to relieve the pressure on Sadiq. Others at the meeting disagreed, saying that the delivery was not necessarily a sign of Libyan support for Sadiq. They argued that it had been planned long ago, and that the Sudanese military want a great deal more than four aircraft. Some attendees felt that the MIG-23 interceptors would be useless to Sudan, although others pointed out that they can be used for ground attack against the southern insurgents.
- Continuing with the thesis of Libyan support for Sadiq, the speaker suggested that a Libyan coup in Khartoum is unlikely for now. Others again disagreed with the main thesis, but no one predicted a coup backed by Tripoli. A majority of the attendees felt that Qadhafi probably only tolerates Sadiq, in part because Libya lacks a candidate to replace him. The Libyans, therefore, probably will continue to establish a subversive structure in western Sudan and will forego attempting a coup for the near term.
- The speaker suggested that Sadiq's program of forcibly removing Ethiopian non-Muslim refugees who are blamed for rising crime in Khartoum is intended to please the NIF, whom Sadiq wants to join his government. The NIF has criticized Sadiq for being lax in enforcing Islamic law in Sudan, but Sadiq cannot be stricter without further aggravating southerners already waging insurgency against him. Thus, he may have ordered the refugees removed as a substitute measure that would appeal to the NIF. There was mild disagreement that this was Sadiq's motive.

Warning Note. Anti-Sadiq feeling in Sudan is at an all-time high, but no coup is likely within the next 90 days. The Libyans will continue to plot against Sadiq as a contingency, but Tripoli is not sufficiently dissatisfied to attempt his overthrow. The Libyan threat to US nationals in Khartoum is higher now than before because of developments in Chad and Libya's extensive infrastructure in Sudan. An insurgent offensive in the south is likely and will garner some successes, putting new stresses on Sadiq and the military leadership.

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SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

The following components were represented at the Sub-Saharan Africa warning meeting:

EXTERNAL:

DIA/DIO/Africa
DIA/DE-4
DIA/DB-8
DIA/JSI-5B
DIA/OA-6
Army/OACSI
Army/ITAC
Air Force
State/INR
NSA

INTERNAL:

DDI/ALA/AF
DDI/OGI
DDI/LDA
DDI/NESA
DDI/SOVA
NPIC
DDO/AF
NIO/Warning

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